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Existential Inertia 
 
Paul Audi 
University of Rochester 
1. Introduction 
Things seem to have existential inertia. That is, things seem to keep 
existing if undisturbed. My dining room table, being Stickley, will 
continue to exist as long as it isn’t destroyed by the western New 
York climate, my two young boys, or any other force of nature. 
Now, we know some things degrade. A penny left outside will 
eventually rust away, but that’s because of interactions with oxygen 
and so forth. A penny in my backyard, then, isn’t really undis-
turbed. Alone in the void, perhaps it would last indefinitely. An 
organism, on the other hand, would not. Animals need oxygen and 
food to survive. But even an organism, it seems, wouldn’t cease to 
exist without any causal activity. You or I wouldn’t just blink out 
of existence in the void. Rather, certain internal processes that are 
adapted to keep us alive in our usual environs would do the 
opposite in a void.1 So it still seems that the default is for undisturb-
ed and inactive things to keep existing. 
This is still a bit rough, but enough to ask the question that 
drives this essay, which is why things have existential inertia (or 
don’t). In particular, I want to know what general metaphysical 
considerations might be relevant to existential inertia—whether by 
supporting it or by supporting its opposite, a tendency to expire. 
This is a wonderful and basic metaphysical issue, as basic as the 
question of how objects stand to their properties, or the question 
of the nature of time or change. And yet, unless I am badly 
mistaken, there is almost no discussion of this issue in contem-
porary metaphysics.2 This is odd, considering its prominence in the 
history of philosophy. 
Existential inertia might seem like a topic for physics rather 
than metaphysics. So before moving on, I want to say something 
about how I understand the relation between science and meta-
                                                 
1 See Lewis 2004 for what happens to a human body in the void. 
2 The exceptions I know of are Beaudoin 2006 and Feser 2013. See also Vander 
Laan 2017 and the references therein. 
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physics. First, I think there is rarely if ever a quick route from scien-
tific conclusions to metaphysical ones. It seems that there is almost 
always some assumption intervening between the scientific data 
and the metaphysical theses that are supposed to be impacted. 
Second, in many cases, scientific theories seem to imply nothing 
one way or the other about metaphysical questions. For example, 
physics seems neutral on the question of whether electrons are 
merely bundles of mass, charge, and spin, or whether they involve 
in addition some substratum that these properties attach to. As a 
result, a number of questions are left open even when we take 
certain scientific questions to be closed. Third, in some cases where 
a scientific theory does have a certain metaphysical consequence, 
that’s because the theory builds in either that metaphysical thesis 
itself, or another one that entails it. And in such cases, I think there 
is bound to be an empirically equivalent theory with different meta-
physical assumptions, one that doesn’t have the relevant conse-
quence. (This is related to the idea that any given body of data is 
consistent with a number of substantively different theories that 
would explain it.) And it’s not clear that there could be any purely 
scientific, not at all metaphysical, reason to prefer any one of the 
empirically equivalent theories.3 
It seems to me that for at least one of these reasons, we don’t 
get a strong case for or against existential inertia from theories in 
the sciences. Still, I will discuss a few ways one might think certain 
broadly scientific ideas are relevant. 
2. Making the Issue Precise 
Let’s return now to our central question, which is why things might 
have (or lack) existential inertia. I’ll be particularly concerned with 
general metaphysical reasons for or against the following two 
theses: 
The Existential Inertia Thesis (EIT): 
Whatever exists is poised to continue to exist if un-
disturbed and inactive. 
                                                 
3 This depends on how theories are individuated, but if they are individuated in 
such a way that no two theories are empirically equivalent, then theories must be 
free of extra-empirical metaphysical content. In that case, it’s hard to see how 
they could support metaphysical theses, at least extra-empirical ones. And I take 
it that existential inertia isn’t observable. 
2
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The Existential Expiration Thesis (EET): 
Whatever exists is poised to cease to exist if un-
disturbed and inactive. 
I’ll now clarify the topic by commenting on these theses. 
First, these theses are contraries rather than contradictories. 
They could both be false if some things have existential inertia and 
other don’t. (It seems correct to assume that the only way to lack a 
tendency to continue to exist is to have a tendency to cease to exist, 
and vice versa.) I will be examining considerations that apply very 
generally, to all material things, at least, if not to everything 
whatsoever. So I will set aside the live conceptual possibility that 
some but not all things have existential inertia. 
Second, our theses say whatever exists. I make no restriction to 
natural rather than supernatural things (deities). Aquinas and 
Descartes seem to have thought that God alone had existential 
inertia. If they were right, then both the EIT and the EET are false. 
But there are still general reasons for existential inertia in play, such 
as possessing all the perfections and being perfectly simple. If we 
found both theses to be false, then, the next question would be 
what features underlie existential inertia. But we won’t get that far 
now.  
Third, I make no restriction to simple rather than complex 
things. (‘Simple’ here means devoid of parts.4) But we should set 
aside an apparent way of ceasing to exist that is possible only for 
complex objects. We usually say a complex object is destroyed 
when its parts cease to be arranged in the right way. If we tear all 
the pages out of a book, we say the book is destroyed. It’s an 
interesting question whether or why complex things always tend to 
break apart. (Entropy is relevant here.) But that’s not the question 
I’m interested in. I’m interested in the kind of annihilation that 
would occur if a thing just blinked out of existence, together with 
any parts it had and any stuff of which it was made. Even incin-
eration doesn’t bring about annihilation of this sort. And for all we 
know, such annihilation never happens (though this is different 
                                                 
4 I have in mind parts as van Inwagen (2011) conceives them, so that they have 
to be objects. On this usage, an immanent property would be a constituent but 
not a part of an object. See Paul 2002 for a broader conception of parthood. 
And see Audi forthcoming for an argument that properties are constituents of 
objects. 
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from saying it couldn’t). One way to put my central question is to 
ask whether the possibility of such annihilation conflicts with (or 
for that matter follows from) any general metaphysical principles. 
Fourth, I say ‘poised’ where I might have said ‘has an intrinsic 
disposition’.5 Putting it the latter way wouldn’t be wrong, but it 
might give the impression that existential inertia is some special 
property a thing has.6 Then it would sound like continued existence 
were the product of some activity, just as solidity turns out to be 
the product of forces that atoms exert on each other. But on my 
understanding, to have existential inertia is for the default to be 
continued existence, so that no special activity is required to 
maintain existence. So we must make a distinction between passive 
and active existential inertia.7 To illustrate, imagine a little particle 
that is poised to expire if nothing intervenes to save it. Now 
suppose that it happens to have the power to intervene on its own 
behalf.8 So it’s a little self-maintaining engine. Such a thing has 
existential inertia, but only the active kind. Passive existential inertia 
is what I’m asking about here. 
Fifth, the relevant notions of disturbance and activity are caus-
al. By ‘undisturbed’, I mean not being causally influenced by 
anything else. By ‘inactive’, I mean not undergoing internal causal 
processes. My thought is that existential inertia is a form of inertia, 
where inertia generically is unchangingness or a resistance to 
                                                 
5 An object is poised to do something provided it will actually do that thing in the 
right circumstances. (This use of ‘actually’ is contrasted with potentially, and does 
not sound right if taken to mean in the actual world.) A bit more formally, if x is 
poised to A, then there are circumstances C such that if x is in C, x will A. 
Arguably, ‘poised’ and ‘disposed’ are synonyms in ordinary English, but 
philosophers are likely to associate ‘disposed’ with a certain kind of entity, a dis-
position. I choose ‘poised’ because it’s free of such associations. See the next note. 
6 I argue in Audi MS1 that there are good reasons to deny that there are such 
properties as dispositions (partly because properties that are not dispositions—
not individuated by a causal role—can account for why things are poised as they 
are). I am setting aside here various problems about the connection between 
counterfactuals and disposition-ascriptions. See Sullivan MS for a nice account 
of the connection. 
7 Thanks to Alison Peterman for suggesting this distinction, and for the idea of 
self-maintaining engines. 
8 An interesting question is how a simple thing could have such a power. Without 
parts, certainly, nothing could have one part breaking and the other part fixing 
it. So if simples could be self-maintaining, they’d have to keep themselves in 
existence by some other means. If we allow qualitative complexity, a simple 
could have some properties disposing it to expire, and others interfering to keep 
it in existence. 
4
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change. Causation is essentially tied to change. It always involves 
either producing change or suspending it. So active existential 
inertia can be secured causally, but passive existential inertia can’t. 
If causal activity is required to suspend existential change, then—
contra passive EI—its default is not to continue in existence. If it 
were, no causal interventions would be necessary. 
From now on, when I speak of existential inertia, let it be 
understood that I mean passive existential inertia. Now we can 
proceed to ask what metaphysical considerations there are for or 
against such inertia. 
3. Occam’s Razor and Thermodynamics  
There are three ideas worth discussing briefly, though I don’t think 
any of them gets us very far in our inquiry. They are Occam’s 
Razor, entropy, and the conservation laws. 
To begin, Occam’s Razor is the principle that simpler 
hypotheses are more likely to be true, other things equal. One 
question is what simplicity amounts to. In metaphysical contexts, 
simplicity is usually a matter of either number of particular entities, 
number of kinds of entity, or number or character of basic laws, 
mechanisms, or other relationships among entities. The Razor does 
strike me as putting the EIT slightly ahead, but it’s by no means 
clear. Fortunately, we needn’t get bogged down here because 
whichever way the Razor cuts, we won’t be closer to answering the 
core question, which is about metaphysical reasons for or against 
existential inertia. Occam’s Razor isn’t a metaphysical principle; it’s 
an epistemic one. It tells us that simplicity raises the probability that 
a hypothesis is true. So even if the Razor tells us that the EIT, say, 
is probable, it doesn’t provide a metaphysical basis for it. 
The next idea to consider is entropy. The second law of 
thermodynamics says that the entropy of an isolated system never 
decreases. Equivalently, it always takes work from outside to 
decrease the entropy of a system. The world as a whole can be 
thought of as a system. So then suppose that things’ going out of 
existence would decrease the world’s entropy. Doesn’t it follow 
from the second law that things have existential inertia? There is a 
lot of detail that deserves to be sorted out here, but I’ll just offer 
two reasons to doubt that entropy helps answer our driving 
question. First, we could render the second law consistent with 
expiration as long as whatever ceases to exist is appropriately 
replaced. Granted, new particles popping into existence—at just 
5
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the right times and with just the right features—would look mira-
culous without a special mechanism posited to explain why this 
happens. But whether that happens spontaneously or via some 
mechanism, it looks like Occam’s Razor is violated, rather than the 
entropy law. Second, as with Occam’s Razor, I think the most we 
get from entropy is a reason to think the EIT is true, but not an 
explanation of why. The second law is a law about systems, and 
unless we’re willing to take systems to be ontologically prior to their 
constituents, it seems that no feature of a system could account for 
any features of its constituents. Indeed, the very notion of a system 
in the second law seems eliminable. Talk of systems is just a 
convenient way of generalizing about the behavior of individuals. 
That behavior is where all the action is. Finally, even if we do regard 
systems as entities in their own right, the question arises why they 
have existential inertia. I don’t see any promising entropy-based 
line of support for the existential inertia of a world-system. 
Is there a more direct route to existential inertia from the first 
law of thermodynamics, according to which the energy of an iso-
lated system is constant?  According to special relativity, energy is 
at least tightly bound with mass, if indeed they are even two 
quantities. So then doesn’t the first law tell us that nothing with 
energy or mass could cease to exist? As with the second law, 
expirations are consistent with the first law as long as they’re always 
compensated by an appropriate genesis. And again, the first law is 
a law about systems, leaving us with the problem of how to under-
stand the relationship between the system and the individuals that 
make it up. And there is one more problem in this case, which is 
that the conservation law seems like a restricted version of the EIT. 
It seems equivalent to the principle that nothing with energy is ever 
destroyed. Suppose everything has energy. Then couldn’t we argue 
that the EIT must be true because if anything ceased to exist, then 
energy wouldn’t be conserved? This argument is valid, but it leaves 
me, at least, just as mystified as before. The claim that everything 
has energy, even if true, doesn’t seem to be a sufficiently general 
metaphysical principle. Must everything have energy? And even if 
the answer is Yes, even if it turns out that energy is criterial of exist-
ence, the conservation law just becomes equivalent to the EIT and 
we’re back with the question of why it’s true in the first place. If 
the answer is No, the question is just why having energy protects 
things from destruction. Finally, note that an account consisting of 
some process by which energy protects things would be an account 
of active existential inertia, and so not what we’re looking for. 
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4. A Thomistic Argument 
An account of the very nature of being would certainly be general 
enough to explain our theses, whatever its other merits. Edward 
Feser has an argument for the expiration thesis that is based in 
Thomistic metaphysics. The driving idea is hylomorphism, the view 
that ordinary objects are compounds of matter and form. For our 
purposes, we can think of matter as that raw substance of which 
anything is made. Matter by its nature seems fungible—any bit is 
as good as any other, and could in principle be the matter of any-
thing. To get something like an ordinary object, demarcated from 
the rest of the world as an individual, matter must take form. Form 
is the specific essence of a thing that makes it the kind of thing it 
is. These ideas are the basis for Feser’s argument,9 which is this: 
 
 (1) An ordinary object’s intrinsic nature is exhausted by matter 
and form. 
 (2) Nothing can give what it doesn’t have. 
 (3) Matter doesn’t have existential inertia. 
 (4) Form doesn’t have existential inertia. 
∴  (5) Neither matter nor form can give ordinary objects exist-
ential inertia. 
 (6) Matter and form are objects’ only potential sources of exist-
ential inertia. 
∴  (7) No ordinary object has existential inertia. 
The Thomistic idea is to go on to show, in each of five ways, that 
the continued existence of ourselves and other ordinary objects 
depends on God. God is a different kind of entity altogether, one 
in which there is no distinction between matter and form. But we 
can set that part aside for now, and consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of this argument. 
Let’s take the premises in turn. The main threat to (1) is that 
there are coherent alternatives. Hylomorphism is an attractive view, 
but whether it is correct depends in part on whether things have 
existential inertia in the first place. They do according to the 
Democritean view that the ultimate constituents of reality are all 
permanent, unchanging, indivisible particles. On this view, all 
                                                 
9 Compare Feser 2011, p. 258. I have reformulated his argument to focus on the 
aspects that most interest me. 
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apparent change, including creation and annihilation, is really just 
the rearrangement of particles. We speak as if a piece of paper 
ceases to exist when burned, but in fact, its constituent particles are 
simply dispersed. And even if, contra Democriteanism, there is 
some genuine annihilation, continued existence might still be the 
default. The EIT allows some things to cease to exist. Indeed, it 
allows everything to cease to exist. It denies only that ceasing to 
exist is the default. 
As for (2), even if matter and form have no intrinsic tendency 
to persist, they might once joined. This would be a failure of the 
idea that nothing can give what it doesn’t have.10 The best we could 
say is that nothing can give what it doesn’t have without help from 
something else. (Even that principle is suspect. Is emergentism, for 
example, truly incoherent?) We can allow that matter without form 
and form without matter are nothing, but go on to say that the 
matter-form union is perfectly stable. The stability doesn’t have to 
be completely foreign from the intrinsic natures of matter and 
form. It’s just that it takes the combination of those natures to sum 
to inertia. Compare an appropriate pair of right triangles. Neither 
is square intrinsically, but put them together and they form a 
square. They give what they didn’t have by pooling their resources. 
There’s more to say about this argument, but there’s a lot more 
I want to cover, so let’s move on. 
5. Two Spinozistic Arguments 
Above, I cast doubt on the idea that systems are real, and I think 
that’s the right stance if we’re working with an ontology of 
particles. But how might our question appear given monism, the 
view that the universe is a single, unified entity? Monism and exist-
ential inertia were both defended by Spinoza, and indeed, he argued 
for existential inertia partly on the basis of monism. Specifically, he 
argued for his doctrine of conatus (striving), according to which 
“Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere 
in its being.”11 Here, I will discuss two arguments inspired by 
                                                 
10 It matters whether “giving” is causing or something more like grounding. It 
seems possible to me that an effect may have features completely unlike those 
of its cause. But that doesn’t seem true of grounding. Still, as the triangle-square 
example in the text is supposed to illustrate, something may get from its many 
grounds what none of them has by itself. 
11 Spinoza, Ethics 3p6. The phrase ‘quantum in se est’, which Curley translates 
‘as far as it can by its own power’, Garrett translates ‘insofar as it is in itself’. 
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Spinoza. The core of each is Spinoza’s idea that things can’t be 
destroyed by their own essence.12 The first argument applies this 
idea specifically to The One. 
(1)  The essence of The One encompasses all things. 
(2) The One cannot be destroyed, even in part, by anything in 
its essence. 
(3) If anything were self-destructive, then it would in part 
destroy The One. 
∴ (4) So nothing can be self-destructive. 
 (5) The complement of self-destructiveness is existential iner-
tia. 
∴ (6) Everything has existential inertia. 
How persuasive should we find this argument? For now, let’s grant 
monism and treat the universe as a unit that is ontologically prior 
to any of its parts. And let’s grant (2), which is just the application 
to The One of the idea that nothing can be destroyed by its own 
essence. Finally, let’s assume that there’s nothing wrong with the 
appeal to essences, though certainly many philosophers have wor-
ried about such appeals. 
There’s still the question of why The One can’t lose any of its 
parts. It’s one thing to accept The One, but another to regard its 
essence as extending to all its parts, per (1). In ordinary contexts, 
we’re often happy to grant that a composite object can lose a part 
without being destroyed. So even if we grant the idea that a thing 
can’t be destroyed by anything essential to it, there’s room to allow 
parts of The One to be destroyed. Why can’t some isolated particle 
simply cease to exist without any grave consequences for The One? 
Why isn’t this analogous to a tiny gouge on the underside of a table, 
which leaves the table intact and functioning as before?13 On 
Spinoza’s view, I gather, what we think of as the destruction of a 
particle isn’t actually destruction at all, but rather qualitative change 
                                                 
Interestingly, this Latin phrase occurs in what are perhaps the two earliest 
expressions of the concept of general inertia, Descartes Principles and Newton’s 
Principia. See Cohen 1964. 
12 Cf. Ethics 3p4, “Nothing can be destroyed except through an external cause.” 
The argument for this is based on what can coherently be in a thing’s definition. 
13 Below, I’ll discuss the standard argument, from Leibniz’s Law, that ordinary 
complex objects don’t survive any changes, including loss of parts. I don’t find 
the argument very plausible. 
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(since the so-called particle is really only a mode of The One). But 
is that how it has to work, even given monism? 
Leaving monism aside, I think Spinoza is right that it would be 
odd for a thing to be destroyed by something in its essence, but 
still, I don’t find the idea unintelligible. Why can’t some things just 
be essentially unstable? This seems to be how it is with a Uranium-
238 isotope. To qualify as an entity of that kind, an isotope has to 
have a certain subatomic structure, and yet it seems to be a law that 
things with that structure are disposed to decay—as far as we know, 
without intervention by external forces. But, importantly, Uranium 
isotopes are composite objects. So it’s open that the reason for 
Uranium decay lies in some sort of conflict between separate parts. 
Is The One a composite object? I think this is how Jonathan 
Schaffer conceives monism, but Spinoza’s talk of modes suggests 
a different view.14 On that view, the universe is a vast extended 
simple, with no discrete parts, properly speaking. We can of course, 
in thought, carve it up into various regions, but these regions don’t 
contain particular objects (except for the big region that contains 
The One). The One can have different features at different regions, 
and this gives the (illusory) appearance of particular objects. The 
One can change qualitatively at any of these regions, giving rise to 
the (again illusory) appearance of the creation and annihilation of 
various things. But The One never in fact loses (or gains) any parts 
on this view; it merely changes. 
This is an interesting picture that deserves careful consider-
ation. One question is how much qualitative variation there can be 
within the confines of a single object. Is it coherent to suppose that 
all the richness we find in our universe belongs to a single thing? It 
seems possible for a single object (extended or not) to be qualita-
tively complex, thanks to objects’ capacity to have many proper-
ties.15 So if there is a problem, it arises from the particular kind of 
qualitative complexity that would be required of The One. I think 
the worst trouble comes from trying to fit ourselves into this pic-
ture. It’s very hard to get my head around the idea that a person 
like you or me is merely a mode of another object, rather than a 
particular object in its own right.16 
                                                 
14 Schaffer 2010. 
15 As I argue in Audi forthcoming. 
16 Kyle Blanchette makes important points to the contrary in his dissertation. 
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As I mentioned, Spinoza’s ideas about essence push toward 
existential inertia without help from monism. So we can sidestep 
these questions about monism for now. Let’s turn to an argument 
(suggested to me by Alison Peterman) that draws on Ethics 3p4: 
“Nothing can be destroyed except through an external cause.” 
(1) Ceasing to exist is a change. 
(2) Every change requires a cause. 
∴  (3) Ceasing to exist requires a cause. 
 (4) When something changes, the cause is either itself or some-
thing else. 
 (5) Nothing can cause itself to cease to exist. (Cf. 3p4) 
∴  (6) Nothing will cease to exist unless something else causes it. 
And (6) entails the EIT. (The difference is that the EIT allows 
things to destroy themselves by their own activity, whereas (6) rules 
that out.) 
Let’s go through the premises. (1) seems undeniable, though it 
could matter in some contexts that ceasing to exist isn’t a qualitative 
change. And (4) seems right, as long as the disjunction is under-
stood to be inclusive. (A change could be brought about by both 
internal and external causes, cooperatively or independently.) But 
(2) seems deniable. Why couldn’t there be spontaneous (i.e., un-
caused) changes? Isn’t one form of our driving question just why 
things don’t spontaneously expire? One way to argue against spon-
taneous expiration is to argue against spontaneous change, that is, 
for inertia more generally. I’ll look at general considerations about 
change below. 
For now, let’s look at the principle that things can’t cause their 
own destruction. If we count a composite object’s coming apart as 
destruction, then (5) seems false. Radioactive decay seems to be a 
counterexample. I said early on, though, that I wanted to set aside 
that kind of destruction, and consider only cases in which a thing 
is destroyed along with whatever it’s made of. This sort of destruct-
tion can’t happen unless the simplest parts of a thing are destroyed. 
So perhaps we can argue for existential inertia by restricting the 
principle about self-destruction to simple things: 
(5*) No simple thing can cause itself to go out of existence. 
This, along with (1)-(4), entails 
11
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(6*) No simple thing will cease to exist unless something else 
causes it. 
So, again, a complex thing can cease to exist, perhaps, by having 
warring parts. But there’s something odd about self-conflict where 
the conflicting features can’t be distributed among different parts. 
So (5*) seems more plausible than (5). 
But perhaps even (5*) can be questioned along the same lines. 
Although a simple thing can’t have two parts that conflict, it might 
have two properties that conflict. Granted, it’s hard to think of any 
plausible example. I’ll close this section with two questions. The 
first is whether there could be such a case. The second is whether 
we should construe simplicity as the complete absence of structure, 
so that a simple thing lacks not only parts but properties as well. 
(The traditional doctrine of divine simplicity takes God to be 
simple in this more restrictive sense.) 
6. A Cartesian Argument 
Where Spinoza argues for existential inertia, Descartes denies that 
any created thing has it. In both the Principles and the Meditations, he 
very briefly suggests an argument for the expiration thesis in the 
context of an argument for God’s existence. It goes roughly like 
this. We exist continually, yet have no power to keep ourselves 
continuing in existence. The only thing that can account for our 
continuing existence is something with no need of continual 
preservation, namely God.17 So far, our tendency to expire is 
assumed rather than supported, but Descartes does suggest a 
reason why we couldn’t have the power to keep ourselves in 
existence, to wit, that the contents of any pair of times are com-
pletely independent. He does not say, as far as I can tell, in precisely 
what sense the “parts of time” (Principles) or parts of a “life-span” 
(Meditations) are independent, but he does say that it is a conse-
quence of this independence that the existence of one does not 
entail the existence of the other. This hearkens to the Humean idea 
that there are no necessary connections between distinct exist-
ences. But the distinctness of times doesn’t entail the distinctness 
of what’s in them. It’s still open that two times be occupied by the 
same persisting object. (That’s how persistence works according to 
                                                 
17 Principles: I.21; Meditation III. 
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endurantism, which seems coherent.18) Furthermore, if the indepen-
dence Descartes means is just the possibility of existing one 
without the other, then we still have no deep account of why we 
can’t keep ourselves existing from moment to moment. We can see 
that it has something to do with time, and more specifically with 
the fact that the moments of time are separate, but I don’t see any 
reason yet why the separateness of times precludes a thing from 
keeping itself in existence. (I also wonder whether the expiration 
thesis is being assumed from the beginning; if the default were 
inertia, why worry about reconciling some mechanism of contin-
uance with the divisibility of time?) 
I do think we can come up with a reason why, given the 
separateness of times, things can’t keep themselves in existence. I 
offer the following argument (without any claim that it was in the 
background of Descartes’ thought). 
(1) The contents of each time are entirely separate, with no 
overlap or contact. 
(2) There can be no causal interaction between entirely sepa-
rate things. 
∴ (3) The contents of different times never causally interact. 
 (4) To be responsible for the existence of something requires 
causal interaction. 
∴ (5) A thing at one time can’t be responsible for its existence at 
another time. 
Then the idea is that whatever else existential inertia is, it’s respon-
sibility for one’s own continued existence, and so by (5) there is no 
such thing. As formulated, the argument seems to imply that no 
inhabitants of time can be responsible for their own existence, so 
that even God would have to be outside time to conserve the time-
bound creations. This leaves us with the problem of how God 
could do this from outside time, since causal interaction requires 
contact or the like. We might restrict the relevant principles to 
natural things, but what difference would naturalness make? 
I’m intrigued by this argument, but not persuaded. (1) is not 
implausible, but also not uncontroversial (once we’re careful to 
                                                 
18 According to one version of endurantism, persisting objects change temporal 
locations, that is, move through time. According to another, they are present—
permanently and in their entirety—at each moment through which they persist. 
I prefer the change-of-location version to the multiple location version. 
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distinguish times from their contents). It seems to require a 
perdurantist picture of how things occupy time, whereas it’s still 
open that our persistence through time is not a matter of extension 
through time but something more like traveling through it 
(bringing our parts along with us). As for (2), it’s a principle at 
home in a mechanistic worldview, but one we now tend to question 
(given the apparent coherence of quantum non-locality, etc.). 
Furthermore, as I've pointed out, it’s not clear that we should think, 
per (4), of a thing’s persistence as a causal process of any kind. 
Again, the distinctness of times is one thing and the distinctness of 
their contents another. If we have the very same thing at two 
moments, it’s not clear that its existence at the later one has to be 
an effect of its existence at the earlier one. Finally, this seems to be 
at most an argument against active existential inertia. 
7. Time 
Still, it is clear that we have to look more closely at time. My 
Descartes-inspired argument blended considerations about time 
with ones about causation, but one might think that something 
about time alone explains existential inertia. For example, if time 
doesn’t really pass, then one might think things can’t possibly pass 
away. Perhaps this is right, but when we say how time does work, 
we may find that there’s a good-enough analogue of expiration, 
even if it isn’t literally cessation of being. I’ll begin with two specific 
positive views of time and how they might be thought to support 
inertia. 
The first is four-dimensionalism, which I shall understand here as 
the view that the basic building blocks of reality are point-sized 
material occupants of locations in four-dimensional spacetime.19 
Note that to be point-sized along the fourth dimension is just to 
be instantaneous.  Now we can argue as follows: 
                                                 
19 Orthodox four-dimensionalism combines eternalism, perdurantism, and the 
B-theory. Eternalism is the view that all times are equally real, and hence all times 
are candidates to be occupied by real things. (Equivalently, eternalism is the view 
that time is extended and so the things in time can be extended in time.) 
Perdurantism is the view that things persist through times by having temporal 
parts at those times, where those parts are ontologically prior to the wholes they 
compose and really distinct from one another. The B-theory of time is the view 
that time does not pass, so that there is no ontologically special status of being 
present, still less one that belongs to different times progressively. 
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(1) All the basic building blocks of reality are instantaneous. 
(2) Nothing instantaneous is a candidate to perish. 
∴ (3) The basic building blocks of reality are not candidates to 
perish. 
Complex things then inherit existential inertia from their parts. 
Now, if (3) is true, then the EET must be false, since it assumes 
that things are candidates to perish. But I’ve conveniently left out 
of (2) and (3) any recognition that instantaneous things are equally 
not candidates to persist. So I think the way to take this argument is 
as seeking to show that the way we normally think about continuing 
and ceasing to exist is mistaken. Still, it might seem that the victory 
ultimately lies with inertia. For while spacetime points never exist 
at two times and hence don’t survive from one time to another, it 
seems to be part of standard four-dimensionalism to assume that 
if a given spacetime point is matter-occupied, then it is permanently 
so.20 It’s assumed in other words, that regions of spacetime never 
change with respect to how matter is distributed throughout them. 
But now we find the weak spot in this argument. I think it’s 
true that this last point is a standard assumption of four-dimen-
sionalism, and indeed that it represents a kind of existential inertia 
thesis. But so far it is just built into four-dimensionalism. We’ve 
seen no argument for it. Nor indeed will the standard arguments 
for four-dimensionalism establish this inertial component. For 
example, the perdurantist account of coincidence—a popular 
selling-point—relies just on temporal extension. Perdurantism 
could still be put to work in the perfectly coherent version of four-
dimensionalism that results from abandoning existential inertia. 
Even the argument for four-dimensionalism from relativity seems 
to require only temporal extension, not inertia. If there is no abso-
lute simultaneity, then things need to be spread out in time as they 
are in space (lest it be observer-dependent what exists). But it’s a 
further question whether spacetime regions can change with 
respect to material occupancy. 
This leads us to a different reason one might give for thinking 
that the nature of time guarantees inertia. Again, the idea is that 
something about time renders it impossible—incoherent, even—
for things to go out of existence. Regular four-dimensionalism, I 
showed, leaves it open that things might vanish from their space-
                                                 
20 Permanent here means unchanging, not for all times. 
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time locations. But this makes no sense according to 
supersubstantivalism, the view that there is no distinction between 
regions of spacetime and their occupants. From this view, we get 
the following argument: 
(1) There is no distinction between a region of spacetime and 
what is in it. 
∴ (2) So there is no such thing as an object’s vanishing from its 
location. 
 (3) Ceasing to exist would be vanishing from a location. 
∴ (4) Nothing can cease to exist. 
Expiration is impossible, so existential inertia is guaranteed. 
So says this argument, but I still don’t think we have a very 
strong case for existential inertia. (3) might not be the right account 
of what it is to cease to exist. Given supersubstantivalism, the 
phenomenon of ceasing to exist—something we’re arguably ac-
quainted with—might be the alteration of a location rather than the 
disappearance of matter from it. What looks to us like matter 
vanishing might just be the “thinning” of a region. So while nothing 
literally ceases to exist, on this view, what we call houses and human 
bodies can take on all the features of what we call empty space—
and that’s close enough. 
And even if we work with the more literal understanding of 
ceasing to exist, I don’t see why supersubstantivalism makes ceas-
ing to exist impossible. Supersubstantivalism is a form of substan-
tivalism, the view that spacetime is a thing. But why think it’s a 
necessary or indestructible thing? Why can’t it cease to exist? It 
might seem incoherent to suppose that a hole could form in space-
time, so that suddenly there’s less intervening space between two 
locations than there was before. (Even this depends on the geo-
metry of spacetime, I take it.) But even if this is incoherent, the 
most that would show is that locations can’t vanish piecemeal. This 
problem doesn’t arise if the whole spacetime plenum ceases to 
exist. And I just don’t see why that’s impossible. Even those who 
argue that it’s impossible for there to be nothing whatsoever will 
typically allow that there might be nothing material or spatio-
temporal.21 Maybe what seems impossible is that something be first 
somewhere and then nowhere. But according to supersubstan-
                                                 
21 See, e.g., van Inwagen 1996. 
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tivalism, locations are not themselves located, so they’re never 
somewhere. Or maybe what seems impossible is that locations 
themselves should vanish. But I think our intuition is that mere 
locations can’t cease to exist, since they are mere containers for 
being rather than beings themselves. But that’s precisely what 
supersubstantivalism denies; it accords to locations the status of 
beings. So they ought to be candidates to perish after all. 
At this stage, an important objection needs our attention. I ask-
ed why a spacetime point can’t cease being matter-occupied, and I 
asked why the whole of spacetime can’t cease to exist. One might 
respond that both states of affairs are incoherent, because both 
involve a time’s changing. But changes happen in time, not to time. 
This is related to a famous argument by the British Idealist J. M. E. 
McTaggart, which we’ll examine below. For now, let’s get this 
consideration in clear focus. Imagine the situation I described 
above, where we have some region in spacetime whose material 
occupant ceases to exist—not just in the sense that it has no 
existence in future times, but in the sense that it disappears from 
spacetime altogether. So then a change has occurred in spacetime. 
But if something changes, that’s to say it’s one way at one time and 
another way at another time. How can we say this of spacetime 
itself? Wouldn’t we need a fifth temporal dimension, supertime, so 
that we could say the 4d block contained a certain bit of matter at 
one moment of supertime but not at the next moment of 
supertime? 
I find something very fishy about this argument. It seeks to 
establish that four-dimensionalism implies existential inertia, at 
least for spacetime points and their material occupants. So even if 
we granted it, it would be open to object to existential inertia by 
objecting to four-dimensionalism. (That said, four-dimensionalism 
is a very attractive view, though I do have doubts about it.) But I 
want to resist the idea that any change in the 4d block would require 
supertime. Particularly if the whole 4d block goes away, why 
couldn’t we just grant that time vanished with it? If it does, then 
there isn’t strictly speaking a time at which it doesn’t exist. Nor is 
there strictly speaking a time at which it did exist, since the exist-
ence of the block itself isn’t the existence of something located in 
the block. All this is just to say that it seems perfectly coherent that 
this block could cease to exist, or could cease to be matter-
occupied. Looking at it a different way, how could these bits of 
matter, just by being located in a 4d spacetime, be exempt from the 
possibility of ceasing to exist? Four-dimensionalists typically em-
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phasize a tight analogy between space and time. We feel no pull 
toward saying that matter can’t coherently vanish from space, so if 
time is like space, why should it be incoherent for matter to vanish 
from time? Or rather, how does adding another dimension to space 
suddenly make it incoherent for things to cease occupying it? I can’t 
see any good answer. 
I’ll consider one last argument from time, again related to 
McTaggart’s ideas. It’s this: 
(1) Ceasing to exist is a kind of change. 
(2) Change requires time. 
(3) Time is incoherent. 
∴ (4) Change is incoherent. 
∴ (5) Ceasing to exist is incoherent. 
And (5) entails that everything has existential inertia. As before, if 
this argument succeeds, continuing to exist also goes out the window. 
But existing is fine, as long as it isn’t construed as something done 
in time. The conclusion allows that there might be a static world of 
existing things, where all is permanent, and hence nothing ever 
ceases to be. If all this is right, the victory lies with inertia. 
It is hard to wrap one’s head around what it means for time to 
be unreal. As I understand McTaggart, a prominent defender of 
time’s unreality, the idea is that time’s appearance of flowing is 
illusory.22 But the account of how the illusion works requires a 
fourth dimension which has at least some of the features of time, 
though nothing we could call flowing. So McTaggart’s argument is 
typically not thought to show that the 4d block is incoherent. 
McTaggart would just say that we’re wrong to label its fourth 
dimension a temporal one. 
More on that in a moment, but first, let’s consider McTaggart’s 
case for (3), which goes like this. It’s essential to time to “flow,” 
and flowing is a kind of change. Change generally requires that 
there be a special metaphysical status of being present that mo-
ments can have, that each moment has successively, and that shifts 
forward from moment to moment inexorably. But, McTaggart 
argues, it is incoherent for times to change in whether or not they 
are present. So time ultimately rests on an incoherent kind of 
change, and thus is itself incoherent. So there’s no such thing. 
                                                 
22 McTaggart 1908. 
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Why is this dynamic present alleged to be incoherent? 
McTaggart suggests two reasons, both stemming from the idea that 
time consists of a series of moments, where each moment starts 
out being a future moment, then becomes present, then becomes 
past. The first problem is a threat of contradiction. No moment 
can be both present and past. Against this, we want to say that no 
moment can be present and past at once, but there should be no 
problem about a change in temporal status. This leads to the 
second problem, which is a regress problem. McTaggart says that 
we want to say that a given moment (say one hour from now) is 
presently future but futurely present. But it is also futurely past. So 
we have to add that it is presently futurely present but futurely 
futurely past. Now, these adverbs are imprecise, and as a result, 
some apparent conflicts are not genuine. For example, one hour 
ago is both pastly present and pastly future. If we interpret ‘pastly’ 
as one hour ago, then one hour ago is pastly present. But if we 
interpret it as two hours ago, then one hour ago is pastly future. I’m 
not sure we get any problem at all for precise adverbs like ‘13 
Planck times ago’. I think if there is any problem left, it is the 
problem about changes having to occur in time, so that changes to 
times have to occur in some temporal framework that times 
themselves are in, supertime. But, first, it’s not clear that this is 
impossible, and second, it’s not clear that it’s necessary. 
I have always had the sense that this argument just doesn’t take 
change seriously. It’s part of the dynamic conception of time that 
moments are present and then not. Can’t this be a brute fact? 
Qualitative change conforms to the following principle: if x chang-
es from being F to not being F, then there are times t and t´ such 
that x is F at t and x is not F at t´. Why can’t we deny that temporal 
change behaves this way? Granted, it comes naturally to charac-
terize temporal change in temporal terms (e.g., a moment is never 
past and present at once). But we can say at least some of what we 
want just using conditionals. For example, if a moment is present, 
then it is not future or past. (And maybe we can introduce new 
ways of speaking to help us say more.) 
We’re a long way from a complete answer to McTaggart, but I 
hope I’ve given the sense that his objections to the dynamic con-
ception of time may be soluble. I want to close this section by 
suggesting that even if we grant that time is unreal, that still doesn’t 
preclude cessation of existence. For one thing, we could grant that 
four-dimensionalism is an anti-realist view of time, and go for one 
of the alternative conceptions of expiration (e.g., the “thinning” of 
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a region). More generally, whatever is left in time’s place, it may yet 
be hospitable to expiration. But that remains to be seen, after we 
have concrete proposals on the table. Briefly, here are three 
promising possibilities. First, we might understand the rejection of 
time as a kind of idealism, as the view that temporal order or 
temporal change is a product of how we conceive things. That 
seems consistent with expiration. At most, when, but not whether, 
things expire would be a product of how we conceive things. 
Second, we might understand the rejection of time as the view that 
there’s no sui generis temporality in the universe, and the appear-
ance of time is owed to some other kind of ontological posit. One 
possibility is certain relations (e.g., distance relations in the 4d 
block). Whatever there is on this view, though, may still be apt to 
expire. Third, we could take change as primitive and argue that time 
is an abstraction from change. If change is allowed, then existential 
change should be possible. I see no need to construe inertia or 
expiration in temporal terms, especially if change is taken to be 
independent of time, as according to this last view. 
So far, then, we’ve seen no very tight argument from the nature 
of time to existential inertia (or expiration). 
8. Change 
I’ll now discuss one last potential basis for existential inertia, which 
is inertia in general, that is, is unchangingness or a tendency to resist 
change. Existential inertia is just one species. So if change in general 
is metaphysically suspect, existential change is too. At the extreme, 
if change is impossible, then so is cessation of existence. Existential 
inertia follows from general inertia. In this section, I’ll consider 
arguments for existential inertia based on metaphysical problems 
about change in general. 
There are various reasons to think that change is impossible, 
and I’ll spend the most time on those. But briefly, note that if 
inertia in general is the default, it would follow that the special case 
of existential inertia is the default. Are there metaphysical reasons 
to treat inertia as the default? It’s tempting once again to appeal to 
Occam’s Razor, but as I said above, it isn’t a metaphysical principle. 
I also said that I find myself thinking that existential inertia is the 
default. I have the same inclination toward general inertia, but 
again, I don’t, on reflection, see a very good reason for it. Suppose 
we say, for example, that inertia is the default because changes 
require work, and so unless something comes along to do the work, 
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things won’t change. On reflection, I think this doesn’t get us 
anywhere. The principle that changes require work seems to 
presuppose that inertia is the default. If things were by default on 
course to change, then it would be holding them steady that 
required intervention. 
There are a number of philosophical problems about change, 
and some even purport to show that it is impossible. We’ve seen 
one, which is that change requires time. I will discuss two others, 
the first of which appeals to a principle called Leibniz’s Law. The 
most general formulation of that principle is this: 
(LL) If x is the same thing as y, then anything true of x is true of 
y. 
This is equivalent to saying that nothing is both true and not true 
of a single thing. (Sameness, here, is numerical identity; not only 
being alike, but being the very same particular entity.) Sometimes 
the name ‘Leibniz’s Law’ is given to a consequence of (LL), that if 
x=y, then x has all and only the properties y has. But the broader 
principle is necessary here so we can avoid questions about exactly 
what counts as a property. (LL) then forms the basis of this 
argument: 
(1) If x ceases to be, then for some times t and t´, x exists at t, 
but x doesn’t at t´. 
(2) If x exists at t, but not at t´, then x exists and x doesn’t exist. 
∴ (3) If x ceases to be, then x exists and x doesn’t exist. 
(4) But nothing can both exist and not exist (from (LL)). 
∴ (5) Nothing can cease to be. 
Premise (2) is the source of trouble. It takes us from something 
that sounds perfectly ordinary (a thing’s existing at one time but 
not at another) to something impossible (a thing’s both existing 
and not). The problem is the slide from including the qualification 
about when the thing exists or doesn’t to speaking timelessly. Could 
there be any metaphysical justification for this transition? 
Perhaps (2) is entailed by any static conception of reality—any 
view, that is, that rejects the possibility of change. But the question 
before us is why change is impossible, so simply asserting the static 
conception at this point doesn’t get us anywhere. What 
considerations support a static conception? 
Arguments like this one based on (LL) are supposed to force 
the static conception on us by showing change to be incoherent. 
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(Similarly for McTaggart’s argument.) But I think that we have to 
assume the static conception in order for (2) to look at all plausible. 
If we take change seriously, then a thing can exist and not exist 
without contradiction by changing. Creation and annihilation are 
both coherent, made so by the possibility of change. So I think at 
best, the static conception of reality entails existential inertia. But 
nothing so far makes us adopt the static conception. 
Still, we’ve found one general metaphysical idea—the rejection 
of change altogether—that supports existential inertia. I’d be more 
impressed by this if I didn’t find the static conception of reality 
unsupportable. Some changes might be illusory, but I think even 
the illusion of change involves some genuine change. The banana 
changes from green to yellow, or so we say. But really, we’re told, 
there’s a permanently green banana-stage, and a permanently yel-
low one. The green one is before us at one time, the yellow at 
another. Fine, but isn’t this a genuine change? I have one thing in 
my visual field at one time, and something else in it later. Ah, but 
I’m but a series of stages, too (comes the reply). So this supposed 
change is just a matter of two static, permanent facts: my t-stage 
looking at the green banana-stage, and my t´-stage looking at the 
yellow one. But now how do we explain the illusion that the 
occurrent conscious states of only one of my stages is the one that 
seems present to me now? Isn’t there a change in which temporal 
stage of consciousness is the one before my mind? Why does my 
experience seem to hop from stage to stage in such an orderly 
fashion? I know of no satisfactory account in purely static terms of 
this very ordinary fact about our experience. Even if we grant that 
there’s no ontologically special present, if there aren’t any changes 
in my own mind, we can’t explain even the illusion of change. So I 
consider myself well justified in sticking with a dynamic conception 
of reality. 
I’ll briefly discuss one last puzzle about change. This time, the 
conflict is between the analysis of change as property-switching and 
the intimacy of the relationship between a thing and its properties. 
(1) For something to change would be for it to lose a property. 
(2) There is no separation between a thing and its properties. 
∴ (3) For something to change would be for it to lose itself. 
(4) Nothing can lose itself. 
∴ (5) Change is impossible. 
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The idea is that (3) follows from (1) given (2) because (2) entails 
that things are identical (or near-enough identical) with their prop-
erties. Many theorists will for that reason reject any no-separation 
account of property-having. Peter van Inwagen, for example, 
argues that the idea of one thing’s being identical with many is 
incoherent.23 For him, property instantiation must be robustly 
relational.24 So (2) is false, and with it (1); “losing” a property is 
really just changing one’s relation to it. I, however, think properties 
must be immanent in their bearers, so that something like (2) is 
correct.25 So I hold out hope for a way of understanding instan-
tiation without many-one identity.26 
Fortunately, there are two other things wrong with this 
argument. First, I hold that (1) represents the wrong account of 
change. Because properties overlap their bearers, when an object 
changes, a property changes too. It may sound like a category mis-
take to say that properties change, but I think the underlying meta-
physics is perfectly coherent and comes with a number of 
advantages—though it does constitute a significant departure from 
the standard conception of properties.27 Anyway, I just want to 
indicate that denying (1) is among the options. 
But even if we grant (1) and (2), (3) should be read as saying 
that no intrinsic change is possible without destruction of the thing in 
question. So the argument seems consistent with expiration. Its 
conclusion rules out qualitative change, but not existential change. 
We could grant that properties are too intimately attached to their 
bearers to allow any changes in intrinsic character. Total 
annihilation is still safe, and so the question still arises why things 
aren’t intrinsically disposed to it. 
 
                                                 
23 van Inwagen 1994. 
24 van Inwagen 2011. 
25 Audi forthcoming. 
26 As I discuss in Audi MS2, a trope bundle theory is one good option, though I 
prefer a substratum account. 
27 On the trope theory described in Audi MS2, properties are loci of change, the 
subdivisions within objects that make partial resemblance and piecemeal change 
possible. 
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9. Concluding Thoughts 
I’ve been mainly negative in this paper, arguing against this or that 
attempt to support or cast doubt on existential inertia. The clearest 
line of support for it, if I’m right, comes from the view that there 
is no change of any kind. But as I said, I find that view impossible 
to believe. So where does this leave us? 
I think we need a lot more work on this topic before we draw 
any dramatic conclusions. As I mentioned early on, there is very 
little work on it in contemporary philosophy. I hope I’ve shown 
the topic to be an interesting one, and connected to a number of 
independently interesting metaphysical questions (about time, 
change, essence, and so on). 
But suppose it turns out that neither existential inertia nor its 
complement is well supported by any other general metaphysical 
theory or principle. What would that tell us? I think it would tell us 
that the question of existential inertia is among the very most basic 
in metaphysics. If so, that explains why very broad metaphysical 
positions seem to build in the assumption of inertia (as in the case 
of orthodox four-dimensionalism) or to build in its failure (as in 
the case of Thomistic hylomorphism). One view is that such 
positions are to be justified as whole packages, partly by their fit 
with what we observe (where that includes fit with reigning 
scientific theories) and partly by their advantages vis-à-vis rival 
theories.28 There’s certainly something right about that view, 
though it is very hard to say how philosophical theories are justi-
fied. Some may doubt they ever are, but even if that were true, 
there’d still be value in cataloguing the way things could be. (After 
all, one of those ways is the truth.) If nothing else, I hope this piece 
is at least a worthy entry into that catalogue.29 
                                                 
28 For a statement of this sort of view, see Daly 2010. 
29 First, I thank my father, Robert Audi, for comments on an earlier draft, but 
especially for bringing this issue up while we were eating lunch one October day 
in 2018. I had never really thought about this issue, and I found myself suddenly 
fascinated by it. And I’m extremely grateful to Alison Peterman for enormously 
helpful comments on an earlier draft, and for pointing me toward and explaining 
the early modern treatments of this issue, especially by Spinoza. Thanks to Ty 
Goldschmidt and Jon Tresan for helpful metaphysical discussion, and to Francis 
Pellegrino for a helpful discussion about entropy. And hearty thanks to the 
audience at my presentation of this paper, especially Kelley Annesley, Zachary 
Barber, Georges Dicker, Yanssel Garcia, Kathleen Harbin, John Komdat, Joe 
Long, Jacob Morris, and Rafael Perez. I am of course very grateful to the Center 
for Philosophic Exchange, and to Joe Long in particular, for inviting me to give 
a paper. 
24
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 48 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol48/iss1/2
25 
 
 
References 
 
Audi, Paul (forthcoming). “Partial Resemblance and Property 
Immanence.” To appear in Noûs. 
_____ (MS1). “Of Power and Prescriptivity.” 
_____ (MS2). “An Argument that Tropes can Change.” 
Beaudoin, John (2006). “The world’s continuance: divine 
conservation or existential inertia?” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 61:2, pp. 83-98. 
Cohen, I. Bernard (1964). “‘Quantum in Se Est’: Newton’s 
Concept of Inertia in Relation to Descartes and Lucretius.” 
Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 19:2, pp. 131-155. 
Curley, Edwin, ed. (1987). The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Daly, Chris (2010). An Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Toronto: 
Broadview. 
Descartes, René (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. 
_____ (1644). Principles of Philosophy. 
Feser, Edward (2011). “Existential Inertia and the Five Ways.” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85:2, pp. 237-267. 
Garrett, Don (2002). “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument.” In Olli 
Koistinen & J. I. Biro, eds., Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 127—58. 
Lewis, David (2004). “Void and Object.” In John Collins, Ned 
Hall, and L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), pp. 277-290. 
McTaggart, J. M. E. (1908). “The Unreality of Time.” Mind 17:68, 
pp. 457-474.  
Paul, L. A. (2002). “Logical Parts.” Noûs 36:4, pp. 578–596. 
Schaffer, Jonathan (2010). “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” 
Philosophical Review 119:1, pp. 31-76. 
Sullivan, Mack (MS). “The Counterfactual Analysis—With a 
Twist.” 
Vander Laan, David, “Creation and Conservation.” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
win2017/entries/creation-conservation/>. 
van Inwagen, Peter (1994). “Composition as Identity.” Philosophical 
Perspectives 8, pp. 207-220. 
_____ (1996). “Why Is There Anything at All?” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 70, pp. 95-110. 
25
Audi: Existential Inertia
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2019
26 
 
 
_____ (2011). “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies.” Philosophical 
Perspectives 25, pp. 389-405. 
26
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 48 [2019], No. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol48/iss1/2
